

## AN EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY FOR A CHRISTIAN CULTURE OF GLOBALISATION

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### *Premise*

The fundamental task of the Church does not change: it is to evangelise, to catechise, and to bear witness to Christ and his message. But history provides no truce, and Christians, immersed as they are in the world, do not have a moment of rest. Today's challenge is called globalisation. We can be in disagreement with the way in which the subject has become topical; we can dispute the view that globalisation is a new phenomenon; and we can refuse to believe that it is a decisive problem for faith. But we cannot deny that globalisation constitutes for believers of all religions an extraordinary opportunity. One is dealing here with rethinking the relationship between the economy and society so that the ethical approach to man becomes central in the debate about the governance of the world and so that membership of the Church becomes the premise for a personal commitment in favour of the whole of mankind. The appeal of John Paul II to the powerful in favour of the poor majority of the world has been so strong and unceasing that it goes beyond the traditional Magisterium of the popes. The subject of globalisation can become the social subject of the Church in the new century just as during the twentieth century there was the appeal to peace and the regulation of conflicts between nations. It is probable, as was the case then, that none of the problems drawn attention to by the Magisterium will find a complete solution, but it is in itself important to know that the early Covenant between God and a small people – that of Israel – has in definitive fashion been extended to the whole of humanity.

In the debate underway about the economic and cultural globalisation of the world, Catholic universalism thus finds itself in the forefront at a

decisive stage of history. Even though there are no 'Catholic recipes' for all the problems (and this is something which is fitting), it is not of secondary importance to ask oneself what the most suitable ideas and cultural strategies might be so as to provide an intellectual contribution on the part of involved members of the laity. My modest contribution to the discussion seeks to be that of pointing out – taking as given the framework offered in the paper by Msgr. Homeyer – certain opportunities which present themselves today to Catholicism and at a more general level to the Christian tradition. I will point out in particular two which are available to us from a vast collection of scholarly contributions and which are mature enough for a more general reflection: 1) the resistance to cultural homogenisation which through a positive evaluation of all cultural histories and practices of life, such as the use of languages, may lead us to rethink our educational strategy without repudiating modernity and without abandoning democracy. 2) The transformation of the dominant model of rationality, based upon forms of the technical, in a form different from human lordship over the world which may help wealthy mankind to grow spiritually at least as much as it has grown materially.

I. The Catholic Church, too, has been for centuries an instrument of cultural homogenisation and of dominion and this has caused by no means few problems between the peoples of the world and for the governance of the world. But it would be foolish not to remember, precisely today when within the Church there is a keenly-felt awareness of the need to recognise her own errors as well in order to achieve a reconciliation which is not banal in character with the world, that Christians have already experienced at a direct and immediate level the end of secure universalism and that the whole of the modern epoch has constituted a new stage in evangelisation and inculturation. Modern Christian culture has made decisive contributions to democracy and social justice, not least because it has always espoused a healthy distrust towards all those ideologies which proposed 'the new man'. At least two very important initiatives deserve to be brought to mind, which thanks to the new season of missionary activity changed the face of modern society, beginning in the sixteenth century: care for communities with respect for their traditions and above all else for their languages – the sanctuary of identity – and the practice of teaching. The modern Christian Church, and not only the Catholic Church (one thinks of Luther and the political and religious use of German), found in the use of speech and its linguistic deposits the essential key both by which to foster

changes in habits and customs and by which to establish resistance to every attempt to deny the communitarian basis of peoples.

The case of languages, of their recognition, of their survival, serves as an example because it has been for some time at the centre of national and international cultural policies. The year book of the languages of the world, published in the United States of America, lists more than six-thousand spoken languages, of which about two thousand have a literature and two thousand have translated, or are translating, the Bible. Statistics applied to languages tells us that the first ten languages of the earth are used by communities with more than a hundred million people: after Mandarin Chinese we find English, Hindi, Arabic, Spanish, Bengali, Portuguese, Indonesian Bahasa, Japanese, and Russian. The experts in the field tell us that the great European languages are to be found in the category of languages spoken by a minimum of ten million people, together with Nepalese or Aramaic, Turkish, Ukrainian and Persian. They tell us that some languages which have been decisive for Western history and civilisation, such as Hebrew, are spoken by communities which may even have a few hundred thousand people and they also tell us that every year languages and dialects disappear in some parts of the world. The statistical framework demonstrates unknown and non-traditional hierarchies, but above all else brings out what is the great paradox of global communication, namely that of a model of society which however effective and universal it may be does not manage, if only to a small extent, to interpret the multiplicity and the wealth of human experiences which are still borne witness to in the world by hundreds of populations that are the bearers of different languages and traditions. The future of humanity lies precisely in the gap which still exists between the different levels of communication – communication through the mass media and communication through authentic relations – and in the irreducibility of the principle of community to standardisation. In this no man's land, which from many points of view is still unexplored, where different social models co-exist and where antithetical forms of living are practiced, it is possible to work only if one possesses something which is real and personal to be shared, if the message really becomes witness, if the time available is matched by life as lived out and language does not fall into being merely the technical.

The practice of diversity through languages as well can become a first fertile way of approaching things which can constitute an intelligent signal of respect to be launched throughout the world, placing oneself thereby on the side of minorities. Historical linguistics, like many other disciplines

which do not belong only to the humanities, is ready to bear witness to the fact that research into, and the study of, languages is going exactly in the opposite direction to banalisation. Lexicography, which has been a mature, loved and practiced science in all epochs, is, for example, by now clearly on the side of a message of prudence and care in relation to every community. Even the most tenaciously held socio-linguistic theories on the universal matrix of languages do not oppose, but indeed help, the rediscovery of the ethical and not deterministic dimension of the human experience, beginning specifically with research into, and the testimonies to, life which is lived. Languages are always in a state of change and it would be absurd to believe that it is possible to recognise changes if one did not also have a knowledge of previous or lateral stages to the establishment of a so-called classic language. The nature of evidence is always fragile and changes if the research into them is not accompanied by a patient waiting for new elements which are decisive in illuminating deposits of knowledge which had previously lain in the dark. The Latin dictionary by Forcellini, a classic work, has as a frontispiece an illustration depicting a man who is apparently sad and is working under an inscription which reads 'expertus disces quam gravis iste labor' – only experience enables us to understand how important and difficult this work is. The observation is valuable, not least because it brings us to what, in other difficult epochs, was the extremely detailed work of text scholars, translators and librarians. What would Western monasticism have been without the codexes and writing? What would modern science have been without the printing press and the rediscovery of Greek geometry through the codexes? Why did both monasticism and modern science become so specific to one civilisation and not to others? These are well-known questions but they are not because of this fact extraneous to the subject of the governance of globalisation. Certainly there is a need to be understood. I do not approach tradition as something which is limited; I am not thinking only of literature or of the codified outcome of an invention; I am not thinking only of the product of a process; I am thinking, rather, of the symbolic meaning which every experience of human action carries within it and which to be interpreted always requires the living mediation of someone, within the framework of an encounter where communication becomes enriched by many more expressive forms than we habitually use or acknowledge, above all else that of silence. Linguistic mediation, mutual translation into even an elementary dialogue, remains a still unsurpassed example of relations between men where the irreducibility of communication to dominion is affirmed. That which once and for

many centuries was seen as a necessity 'for' power – knowing how to speak other languages in order to change register within the schema of the relationship of dominion and which was first the prerogative of a few people but which subsequently, with the extension of the need for social control to a large part of the bourgeois world, became the commonplace of a Western civilisation – can once again be valuable, if interpreted with intelligence and not banalised, as testimony to a different approach to thinking about the shared destiny of mankind and the processes of technological and economic integration. The anecdote about Charles V is well-known, according to which he spoke to God in Spanish, with women in Italian, with men in French, and with his horse in German. But what could appear to be merely the expression of the arrogance of a powerful man who by his own example decided on what was wanted at the level of appearances can be analysed as the sign of a question which in the sixteenth century was already embarrassing and still did not have a solution, that is to say the reason why the universality of political and economic power, the predominance of one such power, is not automatically accompanied as well by the simplification of habits and customs, languages, and laws, that is to say peace and order, but on the contrary there is a growth in incommunicability and disorder. During the epoch and the political and social context of Charles V some answers could already be found to questions raised by the new models of power. While the power of arms and regal representation was celebrated, its limits were also discovered and a new art of dissimulation and a new scientific method emerged to compensate for the rigidity of medieval stereotypes with *esprit de finesse* and the practice of silence and adaptation. What at the outset was only a question for a few determined scientists and politicians endowed with rare capacities for analysis and foresight, became over the centuries the common premises of the contemporary action of the great secularised masses.

II. To practice languages and encounter people directly in order to know them in the space of a lifetime and to build together a dialogue are only some examples of an intelligent rediscovery of reality which are well located within the challenge of globalisation, as an antidote to indifference and as a vehicle for ethical contents. But they would remain mute experiences if they were not re-understood within wider and more structured forms of relationships involving levels of the governance of society, such as, for example, the form of education. The phenomenon of education should be seen as a relational intra-human event of a special kind, and it is therefore

not useless to emphasise the need for a reconsideration of education which helps us to uphold the irreducibility of human experiences, even the most insignificant such experiences, to an interpretation of the real based upon psychic illusions or the manipulation of false wishes mistaken for authentic needs. Scientists and managers have nothing in the least to fear from a radical and philosophical reconsideration of the meaning of education, and indeed could gain from the reopening of spaces of reflection without which they would run the risk of being the victims of their own results. No pedagogic norm, no teaching figure, no psychological inquiry, and no model of behaviour or of business, can after a certain fashion reduce the 'intellectual' specificity of the moral choice – of the decision – in favour of being, just as there is no knowledge about man, not even religious such knowledge, which can deprive that moral decision of the intrinsic cultural dimension that constitutes its 'empirical' character, historicity. For that matter, for philosophy and theology, whose subject is a special kind of relation between men and God, the real possibilities of success lie, as well, in the capacity to bring back attention to a primordial condition of the human being which does not lose value because of the fact that every human relation, even that which is educational or based upon love, is to a certain extent always partial, asymmetrical, destined for an absence of success or based upon predominance, and unsatisfying taken as a whole. Indeed, from the impossibility of reducing the human relation to a simple definitive exercise of power and the relationship between two beings to a pact from which advantages for all derive, as in the case of a political pact, the spiritual view of life gains force which recognises that every human being will never become only that which is sought of him and that whatever the case he will remain, even in total deprivation, much more than a mere social animal.

With the establishment of contemporary instruction as a mass surrogate for education, Western culture, instead, in dangerous fashion, came to no longer see in the educational relationship that archetypical character which in reality belongs to it and which is the anthropological basis of the universal value of knowledge itself. The intensity of the political exploitation and economic consumption of the need to know which emerged in the West with the medieval and modern rebirths was such as no longer to allow the recognition of the 'other reasons' of that need, amongst which, above all else, was the spiritual reason. This was not a defect of historical knowledge or ignorance but rather, if anything, as Nietzsche was to say, of an 'injury of history', of a poisoning. The incapacity of contemporary political reformism to go beyond the formulas of economic reformism has

betrayed the very premises of modernity. Modernity has been essentially the attempt to use the resources liberated by the new economic processes to change and emancipate society from the slavery of dogmatic and material influences: modernity can, in synthesis, be defined as a placing of a bet on production and the use of wealth to achieve new forms of freedom. From the Jesuit *Ratio studiorum* of the sixteenth century to the great mass university systems, modernity has constantly been an epoch of forms of schooling, of training, and of research; in a word, of adaptation to change by an educational route thanks to 'visions of the world' to be internalised through formative processes that were based upon a renewed psychological analysis of human needs. Needs for reforms and needs for clarity went side by side with the birth of colleges, symbolic places where the mission of modernity was concentrated – to progress by learning. From the perspective of centuries, mass schools have been flanked by the obligations to represent established power which were characteristic of the first stage of modern schooling, but they became increasingly less the seat of an educational project and almost always have also betrayed the social demand for emancipation which have supported them economically.

In our time, when it is not longer possible 'to stop the machine' and advance to a mass ascesis, when science and technology make the very possibility of a future for mankind precarious and not only this or that mode of being, that distinction has great value which, beginning with the theory of Weber and his sociological heirs (Parsons, Schutz, Luhmann...), made headway within the contemporary cultural debate between *modernity* and *modernisation*. These are terms which belong to the same semantic family but have real differences of meaning. The difficulties in which philosophy and sciences have found themselves have not allowed it to be declared that the anomaly is created by the existence of some blind 'will' of modern reflection to carry – through an excess of rigour or a paradoxical sentiment of dissolution – the implications of their own lines of reasoning to extremes and thus to fall into nihilistic outcomes. It is no longer even permitted to turn to extraneous solutions or solutions produced by demi-gods because the culture of modernisation cannot burn its bridges with its own acknowledged identity. One has still to place a bet on the effectiveness of that extraordinary historiographical postulate that goes under the name of 'modernity'. If looked at without prejudices, the processes of globalisation, as well, still reveal the characteristics of a series of eschatological meanings of modernity understood as a 'task' and a 'mission', as a constituent ideal reference point for the understanding of what

changes, as a spiritual medicine for the disturbance brought about by greater responsibility not compensated for by greater guarantees of reward. The subjects of the analysis, therefore, are not short on the ground. Rather the culture for their development, if anything, is defective: those that are presented as the positive results of modernity – namely the establishment of rights and freedoms within a framework of increasing legitimization of norms; advanced social differentiation and at the same time its recomprehension within a global process of the expansion of society; freedom through the principle of representation and the recognition of the rights of the person; and the highest possible technological innovation in a substantial maintenance of capitalism – are principles which in order not to be idolatrous require a level of cognitive skills which has increasingly less citizenship within our peoples. We find ourselves in a paradoxical situation: faced with an increase in ignorance and a lack of historical memory we observe an increase in the demand for happiness which it is becoming impossible to satisfy not because of a lack of goods – because, indeed, the global economic risk is one of overproduction – but precisely because of a lack of a new culture of wealth which has little to do with the dominant theories about human capital.

III. The question of how to educate and guide great masses of human beings towards happiness in an open society of the free market is a great political question, before being an educational question, which should be addressed with sensitivity. The policies *for* knowledge assume policies *of* knowledge which are wise and derived from learning. We seem to have a play on words and yet we have before us an ancient truth: democracy, amongst the regimes that are possible, is the only one which is not based only on the ignorance of the majority or the power of the few, and despite appearances and false demagogic forms of modesty has always required the commitment of the most careful and concerned individuals. Democracy needs intelligence and forms of care because it is the least natural and the most rational of possible regimes, being based upon a theory of man and society which side by side with the rule of numbers has amongst its premises certain abstract principles – the principle of individual freedom, of justice, of participation, and of equality – which are not recognisable and acceptable outside a precise model of knowledge based upon experimental research and the sharing of spaces. It is no accident that democracy is an invention of the city. Western society was a *learning society* well before this was discovered by the theorists of



post-industrial society and the 'new' economists. Nothing that concerns forms of knowledge and cultures is thus extraneous to democracy, and indeed one can say that the whole history of the West, including the history of religion, has been a match in favour or against the production and the use of knowledge, as Truth and as Opinion. In a democracy every scientific discovery, every moral and religious experience, every social theory, every artistic expression, and every form of wealth, has become and becomes sooner or later the subject of discussion and political use and has asked to be understood, justified, and if possible reproduced. All decisions are sooner or later placed in the hands of the responsibility of each person, even if most of us do not realise this or strive to flee from choices, except when we refuse to see them imposed from above. As a result, the principal cultural problem of the West is of a deeply ethical nature and involves the increasingly evident detachment between the enormous potential of material wealth, and above all else immaterial wealth, which individuals could have available and the difficulties encountered in creating universal models – 'frameworks' – of behaviour and of sharing.

Economics and political science have for some time demonstrated that the overall poverty of a society can diminish even while within it inequality grows, just as inequality in incomes is not necessarily more important than their level and taking care of immaterial resources. The protection of individuals against the vulnerability produced by globalisation is not, therefore, a secondary aspect of the problem because if people are not aware of the levelling and banalising character that economic development can have on the effective lives of people and groups, conditions are brought about whereby such development advances according to dynamics which deny the reasons in the name of which globalisation is proposed as an instrument of emancipation and democratisation. In the presence of a new stage of major forms of emigration and immigration – of the forced mobility of individuals – and of the mobility of financial capital searching for increasingly large profits, the risks of new forms of alienation, in addition to conflicts, increase, with the consequences of a progressive impoverishment of the universal historical memory and a lowering of the critical consciousness on which to base every possible form of governance. Leaving on the scene an infinity of 'emotional and cultural residues', one helps to increase the number of individuals directed towards a new form of marginalisation which is no longer measurable in terms of material poverty but in terms of social fragmentation and inequality in opportunities to communicate and to take part in self-government. It is, however, useful to remember that the

challenge is complicated by the fact that there must also be a change in the traditional order of the problems which were addressed by theories of education when they worked within the shelter of their respective national contexts and were protected by a more or less shared theory of political action and by a consolidated rationalistic cultural tradition which – differently from Eastern philosophies – adopted as an axiom the principle of sufficient reason, that is to say the belief that everything must have a cause which justifies it and that a man is not to be taken seriously if he does not base himself upon an overall project of reality. These are all cultural conditions or conditionings which are no longer given. The extreme pluralism of forms of rationality and the extreme diversity of life practices hinder believing in a fundamental single intellectual experience, and if in the educational sphere there is a 'pretence' that one believes that education draws its own reason from a synthetic vision of society this is because one is dealing with mass problems in a context dominated by the public hand and by forms of politics which are now surpassed, and politics is the place where the crisis of rationality is expressed with greatest evidence. With the recognition of the ideological character of every military, economic and political power, with the decrease in the illusion of the new man and of utopianism, with the theory of the division of the world into blocs and areas whose membership is based on ideological-political considerations left behind us, our society encounters difficulty when counterposing the evidence of globalisation – which has more intense rhythms than those of school learning and selection – with an increasingly less convinced consensus in favour of 'a society behind desks' where study is preparatory for work and where childhood is seen as an age which contains all the others and is thus special. The difficulty goes beyond every form of school planning and every theory regarding the curriculum – the subject of attention and concern in the great Western countries as well as those affected (such as the former Communist countries) by forced industrialisation: the ignorance of the great masses of the world who nonetheless are turned towards development and apply pressure to enter the banquet of the rich cannot be overcome in a short period and yet must be seen as a decisive cultural element in the survival of the global model of development.

IV. We are face to face with the fact that the Church, too, should share in the attempt to rethink her own social doctrine at a world level. The future of the social doctrine of the Church does not lie, in my opinion, in a restatement of some of its political and historical implications which by

now have been overtaken by developments or which are overly bound up with European history, but rather in a rediscovery of its ethical and universalistic origin, as a method of trust in man and not only as a method of fear of his works. But here it is useful to recognise that it is not only the Church which finds herself in difficulty because in general it is Western political and economic thought which is straining to renew itself. The set of ideas that we still use in politics are in large measure an inheritance left to us by elites who for more than a century led a Europe of the poor, a Europe to be reconstructed after every fight for national independence, after every insurrection and after every war. Even the welfare state and the social market economy, the great and glorious forms of twentieth-century architecture, are in the final analysis the children of a nineteenth-century social ideology. During our century the advent of democracy and of universal suffrage as the generalised system of representation favoured the organisation of minorities and the development between them of a political dialectic completely inside a subordinated majority but one combative in relation to its own material and civic survival. The modern party became a pedagogic and mobilising instrument in a Europe of the poor at the service of highly educated elites which were revolutionary or conservative, Christian or secular, Catholic or Socialist; the bearers of requests for modernisation, change and ideological globalisation, they needed, to achieve their objectives, a participating public and a mediated consensus which today no longer exists.

The panorama has changed radically. We find ourselves in the era of the Europe of the rich. Welfare has to be dismantled and reassembled in a part of the world where two-thirds of the citizens have found the reasons for their citizenship more in the conservation of their own economic condition (or in the fear of losing it) than in emancipation from material need. A Europe of the rich which makes prosperity the basis, if not even the measurement, of its own happiness and which in fact still attributes to savings (the most private and most traditional form of power) an enormous psychological value, making them indeed into one of the most valuable goods still in circulation but one which is unfortunately very badly distributed and above all badly governed. The yearning for happiness and the appeal to wealth tend to coincide and to become a winning political message, which is banal but effective, proposed in all its longitudes despite every cultural and religious specificity. We live in selfish societies but ones which are no longer able to fight; ones which are ill-at-ease but no longer capable of giving themselves a long-term objective; ones which are intelligent but slothful. Societies where the elites

have been replaced by oligarchies and by groups of entrepreneurs of politics, by heads with many arms and with many means but without a body. The majority is by now made up of the rich and a majority made up of rich people is more anonymous than a majority made up of the poor, less ready to be represented, more changeable and at the same time less free because it has more to lose than the latter. Wealth is experienced as a fundamental criterion of security, as a 'home', because the traditional idea of the emancipation of the individual and of the masses has been replaced by the idea of security and by protagonism through consumption. In this way, overturning every political chronology and every civic history, we witness the paradox of seeing noble and cultured Europe pursue America. We speak of a Europe which 'can' become as rich and as competitive as America! And even the Euro, in the way that it is presented at a popular level, takes part to a certain extent in this expression of competition which takes place completely within the West.

If this is the situation, is it still meaningful for those who intend to remain faithful to a Christian approach to repropose at a planetary level a political vocabulary 'of the poor', specific to a surpassed political perspective, or is it not perhaps necessary to draw up a political proposal which sees wealth and security as the second nature of contemporary Western man and which seeks to speak to this man so as to make him rediscover the meaning of giving and responsibility? It is not of secondary importance to express the profound requests of the Gospel against or despite the West, or rather involve ourselves in a process of the redefinition of our task. In reflecting on globalisation as well it is a good thing to begin from what is experienced and from what is best understood by everyone: what could be more topical than a reflection on the condition of a man who is rich but who cannot understand the real nature of the wealth which is transforming him at a deep level? The Western Christian tradition is an inexhaustible source of wisdom regarding the metamorphoses of wealth and its power, and all contemporary ethical reflection, with the rebirth of practical philosophy and the development of the psychological and social sciences, cannot but gain advantage from the encounter with a Christian wisdom which is critically repropose. The question is the following: 'do we today have a theory about living as Christians in a 'natural' condition of wealth? Do we have available a hypothesis which does not deny to begin with and with hypocrisy this condition, but digs within it and uses it for virtuous objectives? What impedes us from drawing up a phenomenology of wealth as a historical condition of contemporary Western man? Not a mere theory of

wealth and not even only an economic theory, but a theory for the action of Christians in a society of rich people where ancient forms of poverty are accompanied by wealth as a spiritual problem? Memories of the Gospel message should not, obviously enough, either produce an apology for material wealth or even effect a removal of the message of Christ regarding charity. But it is certain that the future of Catholicism, no longer supported by majorities of believers or by the power of sovereigns, cannot be reduced to being 'against' or even to mere witness without the delegitimation of the historical and ethical meaning of faith.

To this end, it is not of secondary importance to rethink as well the role of international institutions and above all to stop and reflect on the deficit of moral legitimation which makes them vulnerable. Otherwise one finds oneself acting in a global context on the basis of a technique which corresponds to a model of rationality specific to a history – that of the West – which does not recognise anything outside itself but which is called in fact to operate as a representative of the world. We need not only a generic adaptation of the contemporary legal and economic model to a planetary dimension but also a substantial rethinking of its limit and a new interaction with the foundations of Christian ethics. Were things to take place in an opposite manner we would always find ourselves in the paradoxical situation in which the Christian message does not coincide with, but even does not manage to detach itself from, the dynamics of capitalism, and finds itself in difficulties faced with peoples who very arduously draw near to the market and strive to escape from under-development. How is it possible that the ideology of the rich and of the West presents itself to that part of the world which is only slightly tasting the advantages of development by reminding them that it is not wealth that brings about happiness and it is not prosperity which generates a full life? How is it possible, without giving rise to rejection and misunderstandings, to preach poverty and a new model of the exploitation of the planet, more concerned and careful about immaterial values, to those who have never had wealth and see it achieved at their own expense by those who despise it?

The exporting of one's own civic and spiritual requirements is not easy, above all else if they descend from a long history of imperialism and exploitation. For this reason, the Christian conscience needs not only to rediscover the principles of the faith but also the forms and the means of the language of the soul. It needs a phenomenology of wealth – by now a universal medium – which is able to involve the old and new rich in an attempt at rethinking inter-human relations. Theological research and the

Christian experience of sharing can help us to understand that side by side with institutions which are the daughters of law and the nations there exists another category of institutions which are more natural and rooted, which are not only an instrument of living but something which helps us to see life as being endowed with higher ends. These are those ends which some philosophers call the 'institutions of the human', based upon an inter-human order different from the legal order, upon a 'topology' of the soul, the specific seat of conscious responsibility that affirms in every latitude a lordship which is higher than that achieved by instrumental reason.

It is my belief that the specific potential of these inter-individual arrangements is intact and that its rediscovery would help us to overcome and to fight the perception that by now everything is finished and ruined. Techniques take pride of place over the soul, procedures prevail over vital relations, the economy kills citizenship, but not everything is by now compromised and Christians have the great responsibility of combating the new forms of fatalism as well. If they are capable of resisting the temptation of joining, in acritical fashion, the newly-born anti-globalisation movement, they will be able to make of their complex cultural tradition an effective instrument of mediation and of constructive criticism at the service of mankind.