

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, DISTRIBUTION OF WORK AND DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

This paper will identify and begin to explore some issues that must be taken into account in analyzing the role of international migration in an emerging global labour market. The level of analysis is global and largely concerned with migration and its demographic, economic, political and cultural determinants insofar as the sum of those factors generates movement of labour from South (developing countries, regions) to North (developed, industrialized economies of what is sometimes referred to as the "Western World"). The questions that are being explored range over a number of related areas. Is it possible to measure "migration-pressure" and forecast duration and magnitude of future migration-flows? Does change towards increased development lead to more or less migration? Why does emigration start or take larger proportions in some countries/regions than in others? Who are those first to emigrate? What other options are available or could be made available by development aid?

It must be understood that the analysis that centres on the above-stated questions has significant limitations. In the first place, the analysis is only marginally concerned with capital as the principal ingredient of development. The analysis is not concerned with such vital issues as the evident volatility of capital movements in the free market system and the consequential loss of autonomy in macroeconomic management.

The other limitation follows from the level of analysis which is largely based on comparison between North and South, as if these categories embraced countries of roughly similar level of development. In fact, we know that North must include not only countries under the banner of the OECD but also, for the purpose of this paper, the oil rich countries of the Middle East, the "four tigers" of the Asian Pacific region (Thailand with its

highest per capita growth between 1985 and 1994 (8.2 per cent), South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), Botswana (6.6 per cent) and Chile (6.2 per cent). Again, within the South category, also referred to as the "Third World", there is enormous variation between the large "depressed areas" of Asia about whose prospects Gunnar Myrdal was so sceptical in *Asian Drama* some thirty years ago — China, India and Indonesia — and countries of Sahel Africa. The former are now enjoying rapid and increasingly market-oriented and outward-looking growth, while in the latter economic growth has been held back by an inadequate political and legal framework.

THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

In 1989, the United Nations reported that some 50 million people, or about 1 per cent of the world population, lived in a country other than the country of origin. Barely six years later the United Nations estimated international migration of all kinds at 125 million.

Refugees in 1993 totalled approximately 18 million as the term 'ethnic cleansing' joined the 20th century lexicon of horrors. Some 85 per cent of that number were located in the developing countries; of the remaining international migrants, some 35 million were in subSaharan Africa, with 13-15 million each in Western Europe and North America. A further 15 million can now be found in Asia and the Middle East, where a few countries (eg. Iran, Iraq and Pakistan) have particularly heavy concentrations of refugees.

In global terms, international migration is on a far smaller scale than rural-urban migration. Yet its impact is out of proportion to the numbers involved. Migration is the visible face of social change. It is a face which is often greeted with apprehension. In the industrialized countries of the North and in many developing countries of the South, immigration has become a political issue. To quote from a recent intergovernmental discussion paper, "Migration is now seen as a priority issue equal in political weight to other major global challenges such as the environment, population growth and economic imbalances between regions".¹ The global nature of these challenges was further highlighted when delegates from 120 nations met for the World Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995 to discuss ways to reduce poverty that affects 1.3 billion people — a quarter of the world population. Underlying the discussion of poverty were fears of

¹ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Conference on Migration, Rome.

uncontrolled migration and environmental degradation as articulated in the keynote address by Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark, who called for aid to stem emigration pressure in South: "If you don't help the Third World, then you will have these poor souls in our society ... Europe has now lived through a period where thousands and thousands of refugees are coming from various parts of the world ... ordinary people now recognize the global situation".

The globalization of the international labour market — the central theme of this paper — is itself "the consequence of economic globalization, capital mobility, the activities of international business corporations, and the widespread realization by governments that human resources can be traded for profit like any other resource".²

In general, contemporary international migration can be viewed as one more element in an increasingly complex set of exchanges (trade, technology, capital, cultural) among countries that possess differential power (economic, military, political). This growing interdependence between nations is associated with expansion of the international system; large and growing populations in many countries; growing economic disparities within and between countries; improved communication and transportation systems that permit information, people and goods to flow rapidly between distant territories; trans-national institutions such as corporations, the United Nations and associated agencies (such as the International Organization for Migration with its headquarters in Geneva), churches and a range of smaller social service agencies that employ and transfer employees across nation states; and social networks created through intermarriage and previous mobility patterns that link families and communities together in trans-national support systems.

International migration or the movement of persons from their country of birth or residence includes four major components: the movement of permanent settlers, temporary workers, refugees, and illegal aliens. While permanent settler migration used to be the dominant form of international migration in the nineteenth century and the twentieth century immediately after World War II, currently it provides large numbers of migrants only to the United States, Canada and Australia. Increasingly it is the other three components — temporary, refugee and illegal, including asylum seekers — that introduce large numbers of foreign born population to a variety of receiving countries (see Table 1). While governments have some control

² Salt, J. 1992. "The future of international labour migration". *International Migration Review* 26, No. 4: 1080.

Table 1. *Foreign-born populations in selected countries.*

Country	Year of census	Foreign-born Number (000's)	% of total population
<i>Africa</i>			
Ivory Coast	1975	1477	22.0
Ghana	1970	573	6.6
South Africa	1985	1862	8.0
Zimbabwe	1982	527	7.1
<i>Americas</i>			
Argentina	1980	1912	6.8
Canada	1981	3867	16.2
USA	1990	14080	8.7
Venezuela	1981	1049	7.2
<i>Asia</i>			
Bahrain	1981	112	32.1
Hong Kong	1981	2132	42.8
Israel	1983	1422	42.6
Kuwait	1985	1016	59.9
Malaysia	1980	673	5.2
Saudi Arabia	1974	791	11.8
Singapore	1980	527	21.8
United Arab Emirates	1975	356	81.8
<i>Europe</i>			
Austria	1981	292	3.9
Belgium	1981	879	8.9
France	1982	5002	11.2
Germany	1986	4513	7.4
Netherlands	1986	552	3.8
Sweden	1986	719	8.1
Switzerland	1985	916	14.8
United Kingdom	1981	3390	6.3
<i>Oceania</i>			
Australia	1986	3247	20.9
New Zealand	1981	465	14.6

Source: *International Migration Policies and the Status of Female Migrants*. New York. United Nations, 1995 (ST/ESA/SER.R/126).

over immigration, the increasing volume of all forms of international movement makes control difficult.

Temporary migration incorporates a considerable range of movements, and, it can be argued, is becoming the dominant mode utilized by governments to admit foreigners. Temporary migration includes both migrants admitted for a specific time and purpose (such as work at a specific job), as well as migrants admitted without such restrictions but who have not been granted permanent residency status. Included in this category are the guest worker programs implemented in West Germany, Switzerland, France and other European countries in the 1950's and the 1960's, the *bracero* program under which Mexican workers were admitted to the U.S., the movement in the southern tip of Latin America to Argentina and flows from Colombia and other South American countries to Venezuela. The one region which still attracts temporary migrants comprises the capital-abundant, oil-producing, labour-scarce countries of the Middle East, where workers have been recruited from other Arab countries and from Asia to perform jobs in construction and other sectors of the economy.

The most recent trends in temporary migration suggest that this type of international movement is no longer the dominant pattern, and that we are at a point of change. Temporary movement has been associated in the last two decades specifically with labour migration, but in the mid-1990's it has become clear that the age of great honeypots, like those of Western Europe in the 1960's and early 1970's and the Middle East in the 1970's and early 1980's, is over. In time it is possible that new major centres of attraction will appear, and Japan seems at least one of several such likely receiving countries.³ One thing seems certain: future forms of temporary labour migration of the traditional, low-skilled type will not stop, but will occur in smaller volumes between economies further down the pecking order of international wealth.

The third and most dramatic form of migration is refugee movement. Although a fact of life throughout human history, political recognition of the need for international cooperation and assistance developed after World War I, when the League of Nations appointed Fridtjof Nansen as the first commissioner for refugees. Nansen's untiring efforts secured an orderly resettlement of some 2.2 million White Russians, Armenians, Greek and Bulgarian refugees. Massive refugee movements followed in the 1930's as a result of the Spanish Civil War and, above all, Hitler's persecution of the Jews.

³ Note striking discrepancy between projected population growth and demand for new labour in the industrial sector of Japanese economy (see Table 2).

Table 2. *Population and labour force growth in selected countries of Asia.*

	Average annual growth population, 1980-90 (%)	Projected annual labour force growth, 1990-2000 (%)	Number of projected industrial sector jobs per new entrant to labour force
<i>South Asia</i>			
Bangladesh	2.8	3.6	0.17
India	2.2	2.1	0.42
Pakistan	3.2	3.7	0.35
<i>South East Asia</i>			
Indonesia	3.4	2.4	0.33
Philippines	2.5	2.8	0.22
<i>North East Asia</i>			
Japan	0.6	0.4	3.70
South Korea	1.2	1.8	2.13

Source: Stahl, Charles W. and Reginald T. Appleyard, "International Manpower Flows on Asia: an Overview", *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3-4: 420-431, 1992.

All of these movements paled into insignificance in comparison with the uprooting of some 20 million Eastern and Central Europeans during and immediately after World War II as a result of flight, expulsion, forced population transfers, and population exchanges. Similar to these European dislocations were the mass transfers involving some 12 million Hindus and Muslims after the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and the repatriation of about 5 million Japanese from the outlying parts of its empire following World War II. International movements of Koreans also occurred within East Asia. They had gone as workers to Manchuria and Japan between 1910 and 1945. Many returned after the war, but there are still substantial Korean minorities in Japan and in the Soviet Union. Later the Korean War precipitated large transfers of refugees and captives between North and South Korea, followed by what the United Nations described as the "most desperate refugee problem" — the mass exodus of the "boat people" from the former Indochina after 1975. Other major refugee movements in the last half century include the exodus of Palestinian Arabs after the first Arab-Israeli war, the expulsion of Asians from Uganda, the flight of the various tribal groups from Afghanistan following Soviet invasion, the people uprooted by war between Iraq and

Table 3. *Principal sources of the world's refugees and asylum seekers, December 1993.*

Afghanistan	3429,000*
Palestinians	2801,000
Mozambique	1332,000*
Former Yugoslavia	131,000**
Burundi	780,000
Liberia	701,000*
Somalia	491,000*
Eritrea	421,000*
Sudan	373,000
Angola	335,000
Vietnam	303,000
Azerbaijan	290,000*
Burma	290,000*
Rwanda	285,000*
Sierra Leone	260,000*
Togo	240,000
Ethiopia	232,000
Tajikistan	153,000*
Georgia	143,000*
Iraq	134,000
China (Tibet)	133,000
Sri Lanka	106,000*
Bhutan	105,000*

* Indicates that sources vary widely in number reported.

** The latest (1995) estimate is 750,000.

Source: *World Refugee Survey, 1994. Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 1994.*

Iran, the situation in the Horn of Africa and in Rwanda, and the dislocation of some 2 million people in the former Yugoslavia⁴ (see Table 3).

Like legal migration, the illegal movement of aliens is a response to factors both at home and at the place of destination. The illegal migrant is faced in his own country with unsatisfactory living conditions, poor job opportunities, or other unfavourable situations which he hopes to correct by emigrating. But, for one reason or another, he cannot legally surmount

⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 1993, *The State of the World's Refugees. The Challenge of Protection*, New York: Penguin Books.

the obstacles set by the "target" country. The estimated magnitude of the phenomenon which affects all countries is quite considerable: 700,000 in the Ivory Coast of Africa, 1.5 million asylum seekers in Western Europe, one to two million "illegals" in Venezuela, three to six million in the United States (see Table 4).

Illegal migration has many insidious aspects. Some governments tolerate their illegals as long as they need their labour — the number of deportations rising and falling with economic prosperity. As W.R. Bohning of the International Labour Organization observed recently: "Yesterday many governments were glad that they came, some even told their police to look the other way and newspapers were full of praise for hardworking foreigners who accepted jobs nobody wanted". But after several years of economic recession, governments and newspapers are looking for "scapegoats". "The phenomenon of irregulars", he concludes, "resembles a yo-yo — you pull them up when you need them and you let them drop when you don't".

Aliens use many devices to get into another country. Some come openly and legally — as short term tourists and students — only then to go underground when their visas officially expire. Some aliens use sham marriage to gain entry, a few are sailors who have jumped ship or stowaways, but the majority merely walk over the border to get from Colombia into Venezuela, or from Mexico into the United States. They do so primarily to fill those slots in the occupation and economic systems — the low wage, low status jobs — that are not being filled by the resident, upwardly mobile population. But this is a precarious state of affairs which raises the major issue concerning this type of migration: the likelihood that mass expulsion may occur if economic conditions or strong political pressures mount against illegal aliens.

This brief survey of the major components in international migration serves to demonstrate one principal feature of the trends outlined above — namely, the extent to which migration policies of sending and receiving countries can be used to strengthen political and economic ties. In turn, decisions on the size and national composition of migrant labour feed into political relations between sending and receiving countries. Receiving countries can choose countries of origin of temporary workers in a "buyers market" to advance political ends. In the Middle East, for example, oil rich states can favour temporary workers from Pakistan or Bangladesh to further Pan-Islamic goals and to reduce dependence on Arab workers from particular political systems (such as Palestinians, Syrians or Egyptians). Alternatively, importing workers from non-Arab, non-Islamic countries (such as Philippines) helps, to some extent, to divorce decisions on

Table 4. *Principal regions and selected countries of asylum, December 1993.*

Region	Country	Numbers	Main sources
Africa		5,825,000	
	Malawi	700,000	Mozambique
	Sudan	633,000	Ethiopia/Eritrea
Middle East		4,924,000	
	Iran	1,995,000	Afghanistan
	Jordan	1,073,000	Palestine
South & Central Asia		2,151,000	
	Pakistan	1,482,000	Afghanistan
East Asia & Pacific		468,000	
	China	296,000	Vietnam
	Thailand	108,000	Burma
	Hong Kong	35,000	Vietnam
Europe		2,614,000	
	Yugoslavia	357,000	Bosnia (Serbia)
	Germany	529,000	Yugoslavia and others
America & Caribbean		273,000	
	USA	150,000	
	Mexico	52,000	
	Canada	20,000	
Total All Regions		16,255,000	

Source: *World Refugee Survey, 1994. Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 1994.*

international manpower sources from other obligations flowing from Arab or Islamic considerations.

The second major conclusion of the survey of major types of international migratory movements is that it has become more difficult to distinguish between economic, political and social explanations of migration. Many of the factors, such as overpopulation in relation to resources, poverty or unemployment, can have direct or indirect linkages to ethnic or political conflicts, which at the same time create refugee flows. Beyond this, one must take into consideration events that directly create

refugees. Even if the distinction is hard to make, the study of the causes of migration must include both individuals who migrate primarily for economic reasons and those who are fleeing from persecution in their homelands, as well as those who combine economic and political reasons.⁵

We should be able to assume that labour migration is relatively easier to predict or influence than refugee flows triggered off by a civil war (e.g. Rwanda) or major ecological disasters. We should, therefore, conclude that the doomsday scenario of a mass exodus is only likely to apply to extreme situations where a sudden and unexpected crisis forces people to escape in search of refuge. This is what happened when the Gulf War forced hundreds of thousands Arab and Asian workers to return home almost overnight, when the tribesmen of Rwanda fled the carnage of the civil war to neighbouring Zaire, and when a single storm and flood in Bangladesh made some two million people to take to their boats and try and find refuge in the Indian states of West Bengal and Orissa.⁶

This brief review suggests that the widening differentials in the levels of economic development and in the standards of political freedom and human rights have not necessarily been the main determinants of recent international migration. As a leading expert on international migration put it:

Persons suffering severe poverty are generally more likely to stay put until near-starvation overtakes and they struggle to move elsewhere probably, as in the case of Africa, to a nearby country not much better off than their own. Such persons, it has been argued, pose no migration threat to countries of the North: distance, inability to finance travel and fear of the unknown combine to prevent them from becoming part of a mass exodus. Greater pressure is expected to come from compatriots in better economic circumstances, or from persons in countries higher up the international per capita GNP ladder, who are ambitious, know where the opportunities exist, can raise the travel costs and, if necessary, will risk arrest in a country of the North knowing that their deportation is unlikely. Persons with these characteristics appear to typify the increasing asylum-seeker and illegal populations in countries of the North.⁷

⁵ For discussion of distinct patterns of refugee migration related to *political* transformation following the break up of former colonial empires, the formation of new states and nation-building in ethnically heterogeneous states, see

⁶ Zolberg, A. *et al.*, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Recent examples include Ethiopia, Somalia, Haiti, Yugoslavia and the former USSR.

⁷ R.T. Appleyard, *International Migration: Challenge for the Nineties*. 1991, Geneva: International Organization for Migration, p. 3.

MIGRATION PRESSURE AND DEVELOPMENT

During the past several decades, rapid population growth has been the central development issue for countries of the South. Poverty, which currently affects some 1.3 billion people, has been linked to inadequate carrying capacity of these countries relative to population. Traditionally, the thinking has been that poverty results from limited resources that have to support an increasingly larger population. However, as the United Nations *Human Development Report 1990* (subsequently referred to as *UNDP*)⁸ shows, it is a mistake to reduce the development problem to a mere numbers game. A broader understanding of human development makes it possible to arrive at its integration with the concern about population numbers. The definition of human development provided by the *UNDP* focuses on the people as the real end of the development process. In essence, human development is concerned with enabling people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives.

When this definition — however general and vague — is applied to countries of the South, certain tangible improvements can be observed in the key indicators of human welfare. For instance, during the three decades of the 1960-1990 period, the population of the South doubled from two to four billion. At the same time, in spite of the doubling of its population size, the South can still claim the following achievements for this period:

- growth in food production exceeded population growth by 20 percent;
- primary health care was extended to 61 per cent of the population;
- safe drinking water extended to 55 per cent;
- infant mortality was halved;
- life expectancy has risen by 34 percent; and
- literacy rates have increased from 43 to 60 per cent.

The Report concludes, however, that although the North-South gap in living standards has been narrowed, the average per capita income in the South is still only about 6 per cent of that in the North. It is this striking disparity which lies at the root of the problem discussed in this paper: the relationship between migration pressure (potential and actual) and development.

The argument of this paper is that the view of migration pressure so dramatically canvassed at the Copenhagen World Summit on Social

⁸ United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 1990*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Development is an oversimplification of the link between population growth, levels of income and migration. Two aspects of this nexus require further elucidation.

In the first place there appears to be no direct relationship between levels of human development and income. For instance, by 1990 Sri Lanka achieved a life expectancy of 71 years and adult literacy of 87 per cent, at a per capita income of \$ 400. In contrast, Brazil managed a life expectancy of only 65 years and adult literacy of 78 per cent in spite of per capita income of \$ 2020. At the same time, Saudi Arabia attained a life expectancy of only 64 years and adult literacy of 55 per cent on a per capita income of \$ 6200.

These facts debunk the view that once rapid economic growth and high level of average income is achieved, benefits trickle down automatically to the masses. It seems that even with limited resources, substantial improvements in quality of life remain achievable. The *UNDP* argues that economic growth accompanied by reasonably equitable distribution of income is generally the most effective path to sustained human development. If income distribution is unequal, and if social expenditures distributed unevenly, human development may not improve much despite rapid rate of GNP growth.

The second issue which deserves further examination is one already touched on in the previous section of this paper, namely, why does migration not arise in situations where there are different factors present that would, other things being equal, lead to migration.

Among the factors usually presented as causes of future international migration are, as already indicated, the issues of over-population, widespread poverty, and the structurally conditioned unemployment in the Third World.

In 1994 the population of the world increased by 97 million and the yearly growth is also expected to increase over the next decades. The world's population is expected to increase from the present (1994) 5.57 billion to 6.25 billion in the year 2000, 8.5 billion in 2025 (see Table 5). The majority of this population increase occurs in the South at the same time as the population of the North is ageing. The expected increase in population is leading to concern about how the increasing population, primarily in Asia and Africa, will be able to support itself on the limited resources that are available. But at the same time, South-North migration has thus far not usually originated in regions with the largest overpopulation and poverty. Rather, international migration has been more prevalent from the more economically developed regions of the South. Philippines, India, China, Sri Lanka are examples of countries that provide substantial flows of international migration. It seems, therefore, that *overpopulation can not be*

Table 5. *Estimated and projected world population by regions, 1970-2025.*

	1970	%	(millions)		2000	%	2025	%
			1990	%				
Africa	362	9.79	642	12.13	867	13.85	1597	18.78
North America	226	6.11	276	5.22	295	4.71	332	3.90
Latin America	286	7.73	448	8.47	538	8.59	757	8.90
Asia & Pacific	2121	57.36	3139	59.32	3743	59.78	4950	58.21
Europe *	703	19.01	787	14.87	818	13.07	867	10.20
Total	3698	100.00	5292	100.00	6261	100.00	8503	100.00
Industrialized ("North")	1049	28.37	1207	22.81	1264	20.19	1353	15.92
Developing ("South")	2649	71.63	4086	77.21	4997	79.81	7150	84.09

* Includes former USSR.

Source: Adapted from *World Population Prospects*, UN Population Division, New York: 1990.

identified as a major, independent or sufficient cause for increased South to North flows.

As shown in Table 2, the labour force of selected Asian countries that can be taken as indicative of the South, is also increasing on average by 2.3 per cent during the 1990's. This is taking place due to a rapid increase of people in the young, working ages and also because more and more women are moving into the workforce. At the same time, growth in GNP does not necessarily lead to creation of a large number of new jobs and often growth is only relevant to a small fraction of the population.

Unemployment in developing countries has structural causes that seem difficult to change in the short run. The global economic relationships between the North and the South with the disadvantageous terms of trade for developing countries appear difficult to influence. At the same time, as has been shown, it is also true that it is not always the unemployed who migrate. It is not the poorest who become migrants but people who have access to some economic resources and often have jobs. Their urge to migrate is dictated by the desire to improve their already favourable situation relative to the rest of the population. Poverty and unemployment in the South seem not to be sufficient reasons to predict strongly increasing South-North migration flows on the eve of the next century. Thus, in

examining economic foundations for modern international migration, we must look beyond the lack of economic development but to the spread of increasingly capital intensive economic development to the Third World population that are linked to the developed world by modern systems of transportation and communication.

The current prognoses of a significant if not dramatic future increase in international migration are often based on population growth and unemployment. This paper has shown that such forecasts must be analyzed critically and carefully. It is not sufficient to merely observe that these factors exist. They must be judged in combination with a number of other factors, regional and local, historical, cultural and political, if we are able to predict international migration or changes in it.

EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN INDUSTRIALIZED NORTH

This paper has argued that in the study of international migration the reality of a global economy, polity and social system must be recognized. Wallerstein⁹ traced the origins of the present world system to the mercantilist period in the seventeenth century. Contemporary economists and sociologists have shown that there is a global labour market in the modern world economy. As the world becomes more interdependent and integrated, factors such as North-South relations, international migration, together with refugee flows and development aid are increasingly dealt with by policy makers as high priority issues that influence international relations and security. For example, in the European Community, closer co-operation within the framework of the EEC countries, economic recession, high levels of unemployment, and a renewed debate about the actual effects of development aid are factors causing governments to introduce harder asylum policies and cuts in the aid spending. In general, several governments of the industrialized North (eg. Canada and United Kingdom) are commissioning investigations into the possibilities of redirecting aid to decrease the urge for people to emigrate from less developed countries. The relations between aid and migration is, however, unclear and most existing studies rest on fairly loose assumptions.

Cuts in aid spending are but one symptom of a disease that grips the industrialized North. It is a disease that eats away first at the social tissue of the working population, and then attacks the blood system of social help.

⁹ Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, 1974, New York: Academic Press.

Its destructive energy comes from a powerful dynamic, part greed, part fear, that moves an insecure majority, a fearful business class, and panicky governments, to increasing neglect of what were once seen as their duties.

To call this disease unemployment — there are now more than 20 million unemployed throughout industrialized North — or a consequence of economic liberalization, is to slip back into terminology that narrows and distorts reality. This is not just a matter of people out of work but of a ruinous revolution in behaviour that touches everything from education to marriage. The consequent social problems are enormous and have a bearing on the attitudes to, and treatment of, migrants legal and illegal.

In the traditional immigrant receiving countries — the United States, Canada, Australia, and more recently the oil-rich countries of the Middle East — the social consequences of unemployment are aggravated by a structural feature of the employment system, a feature some scholars have called the dual labour market.¹⁰ Piore, for example, analyzes the United States labour market and argues that imported, largely unskilled labour, can contribute to the creation of a secondary, partially unofficial labour market in industrial societies.

The dual-labour market hypothesis — in its extreme form — presents a model in which the market is divided into a primary sector and a secondary sector. The jobs in the primary sector are largely reserved for the native born. Migrants are found in the secondary sector. There is thus a fundamental dichotomy between the jobs of migrants and the jobs of natives. The role of migrants in industrial economies can be traced to the factors that generate the distinction initially, to the role and function of the secondary sector in which migrants are found, and to the evolution of its labour requirements.

In modern industrial societies, the ageing native populations can no longer satisfy the entire demand for labour even in periods of recession. Many vacant jobs with low status like cleaning jobs and jobs in heavy industry are shunned by younger native born people whose training has predisposed them for better jobs in industry and, increasingly so, in the service sector. There is little doubt that social welfare support has reduced labour mobility and relieved pressure, especially on educated youth, to accept uncongenial jobs. In these circumstances, jobs with low status are filled with labour from the parallel, secondary labour market.

Part of the theory of the secondary labour market is the proposition that it only competes with the primary labour market to a certain extent,

¹⁰ M.J. Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour in Industrial Societies*, 1986, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

and for this reason, it is assumed to lie in the interests of the employer to support the immigration of labour. This analysis was applied mostly to the immigration experience of the United States (Puerto Rican and Mexican labour) and Western Europe (Turks in Germany, and Algerians in France) in the 1960's and 70's. The lengthy recession and stagflation that followed at the end of the 1970's meant that labour migration largely ceased.¹¹ Despite the shrinking labour market, however, migration and refugee flows to the North increased. Both refugees and other immigrants, especially family members allowed under various reunion programs, have now become competitors for limited job vacancies and shrinking social welfare, and this may have contributed to the increasing xenophobia and unrest in many countries.

The structural impact of immigration must also be seen in the context of internationalization of the labour market. Two points must be noted concerning the flow of capital and the impact on the countries of emigration. Industrial capital flows more and more from the centre to the periphery when capital is scarce but labour is plentiful and cheap. Thus, in less developed countries of the South, industries are established that produce for export to the world markets.¹² In opposition to this, it has been emphasized that the overwhelming portion of industrial production, despite the new international division of labour, still takes place in the centre, i.e. in the developed North.¹³ It is clear, however, that the structural changes in the American and European labour markets have decreased demand for labour in those industries that were filled by immigrants during the 1960's and 70's. At the same time, new economic opportunities created in the South may have contributed to emigration pressure by new groups in the population taking paid employment and changing traditional work structures.

The second consequence of the new international division of labour is its impact on the relative ranking of regions. It has been argued that migration has historically occurred particularly from regions with relatively lower wages (the periphery) to regions with higher wages (the core). Capital strives for profit maximization while labour strives for a successive equalization of global wage differentials, but it is always labour that comes up short. International migration can be a result of trade and financial

¹¹ Portes, A. and J. Walton, *Labor, Class and the International System*, 1981, New York: Academic Press.

¹² F. Probel, *et al.*, *The New International Division of Labour*, Cambridge University Press.

¹³ R. Cohen, *The New Helots: Migrants in the International Division of Labour*, 1987, Gower: Avebury.

contacts between politically and economically unequal units in the world system. But the changes that take place in the global system are only the changing of position and rank by single states. The structure itself of unequally distributed wage zones remains unchanged and this generates potential emigration pressures.

The inequalities in wage levels are also reinforced by structural inequalities of power relations since many regions of the South depend on their development on the North. As argued by some representatives of the dependency school,¹⁴ countries of potential emigration become dependent on more powerful and financially strong countries of immigration. The structural inequalities deepen the difficulties or achieving changes in the emigration countries and give rise to increased emigration from the periphery to the core, a migration that is expanding all the time through social networks.

CONCLUSION

The widening gap in development levels between the South and North, and the resulting inequality of wage levels, present a major challenge to policy makers in the global context. There is overwhelming evidence that the dominant model of modernization within the neoclassical economic theory¹⁵ which saw migration as an essentially positive solution for underdeveloped countries with surplus population is not valid. As Apleyard put it,¹⁶ "There is now general consensus that the South-North predicament cannot, nor ever could be solved through emigration *per se*. The orders of magnitude ... are too large; nor would countries of the North open their gates to all comers ... Even if some western countries decided to increase substantially immigration as one means of arresting demographic decline (and the OECD has warned that this is not so easy a 'solution' as sometimes thought), intakes would certainly be selective (young, skilled workers and their families) and numbers suggested would have no noticeable affect on North-South demographic differentials".

¹⁴ F. Cardoso, E. Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, 1979, Berkeley: University of California; A.G. Frank, *Latin American Underdevelopment or Revolution*, 1969, New York: Monthly Review Press; S. Adler, *International Migration and Dependence*, 1977, Hampshire: Saxon House.

¹⁵ Eg. W.A. Lewis, *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour*, 1954, Manchester Sch. Econ. Soc. Studies, vol. 22, No. 2; C.P. Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth: the Role of Labour Supply*, 1967, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 76.

The international division of labour which has emerged in the past half century is certainly far removed from the neoclassical model of a global employment market. In exploring the reality of this situation we must consider two aspects to which reference has already been made in this paper: the relationship between population growth and economic growth, and the myth of international labour mobility as a panacea to development.

On the issue of population growth and its impact on economic growth, the most recent report of the US National Research Council (NRC)¹⁷ retreats very substantially from many previous assessments which concluded that population growth exerted a strong negative impact on development. We now learn that while slower population growth would be beneficial to most developing economies, it is hard to assess how beneficial. Most early assessments emphasized the adverse impact on saving and investment, yet that argument is substantially qualified by the NRC report. Instead, it highlights problems of overconsuming resources where property rights are absent or enforced with considerable cost or difficulty, coupled with the likelihood that recovery from such overconsumption may not be possible.

One crucial, theoretical, aspect of the NRC report needs to be highlighted in a paper concerned with employment policies conducive to the maximization of growth. The report emphasizes individual, community and institutional responses to initial effects of population change, for example, conservation in response to scarcity, substitution of abundant for scarce factors of production, expansion of output when resource scarcity triggers price increases, innovation and adoption of technologies to exploit profitable opportunities. These responses largely explain the absence of any apparent correlation between per capita output growth and population growth in the aggregate. Specifically, the authors note "... the key [is the] mediating role the human behaviour and ambitions play in the relation between population growth and economic processes" (p. 4).

The revisionist nature of the NRC report and its emphasis on human behaviour and human institutions (or, in technical terms, on feedbacks, largely market-induced, in response to population change) not only helps us to downplay population pressure as the bogey of development, but also to highlight a key principle of the Church's social teaching. I refer to the principle of subsidiarity in its focus on the internal life of a community of a 'lower order' and its opposition to all forms of collectivism (*Centessimus annus*, 48, 4).

By concentrating our attention on this essentially moral question, we

¹⁷ National Research Council, Working Group on Population Growth and Economic Development, Committee on Population, 1986. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

move away from the preoccupation of policy makers with the neo-Malthusian approach to human numbers. This paper argues that the question first asked by Malthus is the wrong question. The question is not about human numbers and how many people can be supported by this earth. The question is about the quality of life which this earth will sustain. This is a moral question which can never be answered by science.

The next question is how much longer the existing international economic order can be sustained. How much longer can 15 per cent of the population of the world control 80 per cent of the world's income? How long can the world sustain, let alone tolerate, the malnutrition — related deaths of 14 million children a year, while North Americans spend \$ 5 billion on special diets to lower their calorie intake? What does it say about the world economic order when the annual consumption of Pepsi and Coke by Americans is nearly twice the value of the GNP of Bangladesh?

These and related issues touch the very core of the moral question posed in *Redemptor hominis* where John Paul II for the first time (and in seeming contrast to his predecessors) criticised the modern process of development. He said that in the present international order we have the parable of the rich man and Lazarus writ large (*Redemptor hominis*, 16). And in *Sollicitudo rei socialis* he raised the issue of overconsumption as related to the affluent North.

Is there a common denominator in these persistent calls for a concrete commitment to solidarity and charity on the part of the affluent North? I think there is one general philosophical assumption spelt out in *Centesimus annus*, namely, the ideal of individualism that Tocqueville first discerned in his classic study *De la démocratie en Amérique*.

The ideal of individualism promotes more favourable attitudes toward innovation, it enhances capacity to confront the future which will be different from the past, but by freeing the individual from tradition and the past presents a serious challenge to social cohesion, solidarity and social stability. Rampant individualism has created the essential institutional invention of an industrial capitalism and by extending it to the current model of development has not contributed in equal measure to man's happiness.

The classical assumption of perfect competition incorporates the philosophical assumption of the ideal of individualism. This paper has argued that such a model is of little use in analysis of an international labour market.

"The perfectly free economy requires perfectly mobile human beings" wrote Walter Lippmann with relation to the American economy. I have argued that the good of perfect labour mobility is a myth on the global

scale. In any one country, and particularly in developing countries, a minority of the labour force may have the opportunity to profit from international labour mobility, but most people prefer to live and die close to where they were born, and to work at the trade they first chose. Given this tendency, we have no option but to consider what Frederick Hayek presciently said in 1974 that we have to "make people at large understand that ... it is no longer in our power to ... maintain full employment and a tolerable productive organization of the economy ... This can be achieved only by that steady restructuring of the use of all resources in adaptation to changing real conditions ...".

When Hayek spoke of the "restructuring of the use of all resources" he referred to the need for reform of basic institutional structures that help to maximize employment. Applied to global economy we include in this goal development policies for the purpose of maximizing employment. Importantly this includes human development as envisaged in the *UNDP*. Some of the social priorities here include the seeking of more resources to foster linkages between social and economic development, integrating better funded humanitarian support and the launching of macroeconomic programs more effectively, helping settlement of refugees, and so on. In promoting such reforms "the principle of subsidiarity is of particular relevance. The international community cannot pretend to substitute properly for the responsibilities of governments and of the decentralized bodies of the countries".¹⁸

All in all then, the issue of appropriate employment policies and migratory pressures in a world economy split into the haves and the have-nots must be treated in a holistic manner to encompass development co-operation, refugee, and immigration policies. A comprehensive development strategy in which international migration is assigned a specific role represents the most promising direction.

¹⁸ M. Camdessus, "Reform of the basic institutional structure", in Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *World Development and Economic Institutions*, 1994. Vatican City, pp. 23-4.